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I. Removing “Uneasiness” 
We can imagine a family—or any other tightly bonded social unit, 
for that matter—in which it is accepted, celebrated, and, furthermore, 
expected, and expected at a deep normative level, that things will be done 
the way they have always been done in the family. The faithful life of 
this particular family will ever amount to constructing and re-con-
structing its future along the lines, and only along the lines, that it has 
already entrenched as norms, customs, and rules. The best this family 
can do, pursuant to its own normative commitments, is to make of it-
self the best possible instance of the principles it already accepts. Let 
us call this family an instance of constructivism.1 Life is always a work 
in progress, and in the case of this family the construction project is 
limited to what can be made of the conceptual Tinkertoys already in 
the family box. 
 
 * Professor of Law and John F. Scarpa Chair in Catholic Legal Studies, Villanova Uni-
versity School of Law. I am grateful to Professor Lynn Wardle for the invitation to prepare and 
deliver this paper at the Symposium on Whether Legalization of Same-Sex Marriage Is Constitutionally 
Required at the J. Reuben Clark Law School at Brigham Young University, held November 2, 
2012. I also wish to express my thanks to the other speakers, especially Scott FitzGibbon, Augusto 
Zimmerman, and Ursula Cristina Basset, for their helpful comments on this paper and to the 
BYU law students for their interesting conversation and exemplary hospitality. 
 1. On constructivism as a philosophical concept, see Constructivism in Practical 
Philosophy (James Lenman & Yonatan Shemmer eds., 2012). 
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We can also imagine a family—or any other tightly bonded social 
unit—in which inherited norms, customs, and rules are presumptively 
decisive, yet also open to revision as insight grows into what has been 
handed down. No family can live every day as if it were its first, but 
measured openness to change offers cause for hope. To be sure, there 
is risk in this open way of living; the future could be better, or it could 
be worse, than the past or the present. Either way, though, it will be 
more alive because it will not be just a matter of “wash, rinse, repeat” 
until the sun no longer shines. It will be more alive due to its openness 
to the deep springs of reality that do not, and never could, enter human 
understanding all at once, or once and for all. The best this family can 
do is to make of itself the best possible instance of what nature and 
grace indicate and docile inquiry brings to light, progressively and cu-
mulatively, over time. Let us call this family an instance of Greco-Ca-
tholicism. Its project is to live the truth, veritatem agere. 
The differences between these two sorts of families are redupli-
cated, mutatis mutandis, in states and in the cultures that drive states. 
States and cultures can be rigid constructivist edifices, or they can be 
developing works in progress toward the truth. The constructivist state 
has a limited number of principles from which to work.2 The Greco-
Catholic state, by contrast, has the whole range of being, both natural 
and supernatural, at its disposal, at least in potency. 
What has all of this to do with the question of whether same-sex 
unions should be recognized at law? Not what one might at first blush 
be tempted to suppose. 
The contemporary American constructivist is apt to conclude that 
he has a ready rejoinder to the call for legal recognition of same-sex 
union. According to the self-confident constructivist, marriage should 
be defined as exclusively between one man and one woman for the 
simple reason that this is the way we have always defined it in the 
United States. The constructivist reasons that opposite-sex union is 
the only relevant concept we have to work with in the inherited box. 
To be sure, the constructivist is likely to have some quite flattering 
things to say on behalf of the principles and concepts to which he is 
committed, and some or perhaps all of these flatteries may even be 
 
 2. Ronald Dworkin’s jurisprudence is an instance of constructivism. Dworkin gives the 
example of using dinosaur fossils (Tinkertoys) to construct the best dinosaur we (think we) can, 
not to recreate or approximate the real dinosaur whose fossils we have found. See Steven Guest, 
Ronald Dworkin 149 (2d ed. 1997). Modernity is a long and fruitless love affair with the form-
less. 
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true. The constructivist’s distinguishing mark, however, is that his fu-
ture will resemble his past, regardless of the truth vel non of his princi-
ples. He’s prepared to stand by those principles, come what may. The 
recent practice of redefining marriage to include couples of the same 
sex must be repudiated posthaste, according to the constructivist, ex-
actly because it violates the grundnorm of constructivism—a closed sys-
tem. For a pure constructivist, the existence of the inherited opposite-
sex definition of marriage is sufficient justification for denying legal 
recognition to same-sex unions. The constructivist has imposed what 
Eric Voegelin refers to as an “interdict on the question.”3 
What I would say in reply to the constructivist is “not so fast.” The 
constructivist approach to the same-sex union question suffers the fol-
lowing national embarrassment: the principles to which this nation was 
dedicated at its Founding cut in favor of—not against—recognition of 
same-sex unions. True, Americans have almost always defined mar-
riage as between individuals of the opposite sex, but most contempo-
rary American opponents of legal recognition of same-sex union are 
committed, on a practical and a principled basis, to the constructivist 
project that took shape in the period preceding 1776 and extending 
through 1789. Those I have in mind, many of whom self-describe as 
“neo-conservatives,” are fundamentalists about the principles on 
which this nation was founded and to which it has ever since been 
proudly dedicated. When it comes to same-sex unions, this fundamen-
talism makes them hoist of their own petard, though they hardly see it 
coming. 
But here it comes: who will rise to deny that the United States was 
founded, above all, to give constitutional effect to the opening salvo of 
the Declaration of Independence, the following moral idea that was 
first expressed by John Locke: all men “must be allowed to pursue their 
happiness, nay, cannot be hindered. . . .”?4 The transcendent point for 
Locke and his disciples, moreover, is that the “happiness” they cham-
pion is not man’s summum bonum as understood in the Greco-Catholic 
tradition. For Lockeans, the pursuit of happiness boils down to neither 
more nor less than the removal of “uneasiness.”5 Period. “Lockean 
 
 3. Eric Voegelin, Order and History: The Ecumenic Age 330 (1974) (“This inter-
dict on the Question is the symptom of a self-contradiction which makes the existentially open 
participation in the process of reality impossible.”). 
 4. John Locke, The Works of John Locke in Nine Volumes: The Reasonable-
ness of Christianity, as Delivered in the Scriptures 149 (London, C. Baldwin, 12th ed. 
1824), available at http://hdl.handle.net/2027/uc1.b3924434. 
 5. John Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding 105 (Kenneth P. 
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man is as easily troubled as he is easily contented.”6 To the achieve-
ment of this latter, modest end, civil society seeks to “procur[e], 
preserv[e], and advanc[e] . . . civil interests,” such as “life, liberty, 
health, and indolency of body; and the possession of outward things, 
such as money, lands, houses, furniture, and the like,”7 and nothing 
more than that, certainly not the care of souls.8 
In the innocuous-sounding Lockean language of the pursuit of 
happiness is contained the concentrated germ of the revolution known 
as liberalism. And it is a revolution that keeps on giving, for it is beyond 
obvious that recognizing same-sex unions would indeed remove con-
siderable “uneasiness” for persons who wish to be united with a person 
of the same sex. Dedication to—or even acceptance of—“happiness” 
as the removal of “uneasiness” militates in favor of legal recognition of 
same-sex unions. Scandalous though it may sound to some, those com-
mitted to the nation’s founding principle of the pursuit of happiness as 
the (mere) removal of “uneasiness” are required, on pain of incon-
sistency, to give legal effect to same sex unions. 
II. The First Creedal Nation in Human History 
What, then, are such constructivists to do? One possible response 
is to concede the nation’s Lockean pedigree, but point out that Locke 
himself recognized marriage as a pre-state society between man and 
woman. The latter point, about Locke’s understanding of marriage, is 
true as far as it goes, but it does not go nearly far enough. To begin 
with, one can ask whether Locke’s defense of “conjugal society,” as he 
prefers to call it, amounts to a deliberate, strategic inconsistency on 
Locke’s part. One need not be a Straussian to acknowledge that Locke 
is a slippery soul. Locke’s (partial) defense of marriage certainly masks 
the implications of his novel account of happiness. The question that 
merits serious attention is the following: can restricting marriage to 
opposite-sex unions be defended without contradicting Locke’s basic 
commitment to happiness as the removal of uneasiness? Does Locke’s 
account of happiness, when taken for all it is worth, not sublate his 
 
Winkler ed., Hackett Publ’g Co. 1996) (1689). 
 6. Pierre Manent, The City of Man 131 (Marc A. LePain trans., Princeton Univ. 
Press 1998) (1994); see also Michael P. Zuckert, Launching Liberalism: On Lockean Po-
litical Philosophy 11, 224 (2002). 
 7. John Locke, A Letter Concerning Toleration, in The Selected Political Writings 
of John Locke 125, 129 (Paul E. Sigmund ed., Norton Critical ed. 2005). 
 8. On the specific prohibition against care of souls, see infra text accompanying note 78. 
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definition of marriage? Or does Locke privilege marriage over “happi-
ness,” the very sin alleged by contemporary advocates of same-sex mar-
riage? 
The “conjugal society” Locke defends is not remotely what tradi-
tion understood marriage to be: an indissoluble life-long union.9 Mar-
riage, as Locke expounds it, already shows a novel plasticity. It amounts 
to a union that is freely terminable when the couple’s offspring are old 
enough “to provide for themselves.”10 According to Locke, 
[T]he father, who is bound to take care for those he hath begot, is 
under an obligation to continue in conjugal society with the same 
woman longer than other creatures, whose young being able to sub-
sist of themselves before the time of procreation returns again, the 
conjugal bond dissolves of itself, and they are at liberty, till Hymen 
at his usual anniversary season summons them again to choose new 
mates.11 
Locke is adamant that “the chief, if not the only reason, why the 
male and female in mankind are tied to a longer conjunction than other 
creatures” is the longer dependency of human children.12 With chil-
dren out of the way, Locke’s civil society has no interest in conjugal 
society. Although Locke does show an unexpected interest in progen-
itiveness, this does not lead him to defend traditional marriage; instead 
he contends that “barren women may be divorced.”13 What limited de-
fense of marriage Locke advances runs out when children are not part 
of the picture. 
Another possible reply available to the constructivist is to deny that 
the nation was dedicated to Lockeanism to the extent that I have con-
tended, and or work to show that the elements of its constructivist pro-
ject are, therefore, more varied, and perhaps more traditional, than I 
 
 9. See John Witte, Jr., From Sacrament to Contract: Marriage, Religion, and 
Law in the Western Tradition 31, 46, 283–85, 289–90 (2d ed. 2012). 
 10. John Locke, The Second Treatise of Government, in The Selected Political Writ-
ings of John Locke, supra note 7, at 17, 50; see also id. at 50–52 [hereinafter Locke, The Second 
Treatise of Government]. 
 11. Id. at 51 (footnote omitted). 
 12. Id. 
 13. John Locke, Locke: Political Essays xxvi, 255–57 (Mark Goldie ed., 1997) [here-
inafter Locke, Political Essays]; see also Jeremy Waldron, God, Locke, and Equality: 
Christian Foundations of John Locke’s Political Thought 21–43 (2002); Rachel Weil, 
Political Passions: Gender, the Family, and Political Argument in England 1680–
1714, at 28–30 (1999). Locke’s objection to “adultery, incest, and sodomy” is that they interfere 
with the “increase of mankind.” John Locke, The First Treatise of Government, in The Selected 
Political Writings of John Locke, supra note 7, at 11. 
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have contended. Be that as it may, it suffices for my present purpose to 
counter that, to the extent that the nation is dedicated to Locke’s under-
standing of happiness enshrined in the American scripture—that is the 
Declaration of Independence—to that extent marriage cannot be lim-
ited to opposite-sex unions. I view that extent to be great indeed, as do 
others with understanding more learned than my own. 
Consider G.K. Chesterton’s typically trenchant insight that 
“America is the only nation in the world that is founded on a creed. 
That creed is set forth with dogmatic and even theological lucidity in 
the Declaration of Independence.”14 Pauline Maier was not claiming 
anything shocking when she entitled her book about the Declaration’s 
drafting American Scripture.15 And, as Chesterton goes on to say, Amer-
ica is “a nation with the soul of a church.”16 By taking on “a churchly 
function in becoming the community of righteousness,” the American 
nation became “the primary agent of God’s meaningful activity in his-
tory . . . .”17 As Christopher Ferrara has observed in this vein, “Lincoln 
was not employing a mere trope in his declaration that ‘when the peo-
ple rise in masses in behalf of the Union and the liberties of their coun-
try, truly it may be said, “The gates of hell shall not prevail against 
them.”’”18 The late Richard John Neuhaus, doyen of American neo-
conservatives, can hardly wait to confirm the point: “America is the first 
creedal nation in human history. America did not just happen. It was pro-
fessed into being. In that sense, America is the first universal nation, for 
all who are convinced can join in professing its creed. . .”19 And the first 
article of that creed is that all men have a right to “the pursuit of hap-
piness” by the removal of “uneasiness.” 
It is beyond dispute that this nation was founded to give effect to 
the then-emergent creed of what we now refer to as liberal political 
 
 14. Christopher A. Ferrara, Liberty, the God that Failed: Policing the Sacred 
and the Myth-Making of the Secular State, from Locke to Obama 604 (2012) (quoting 
21 G.K. Chesterton, The Collected Works of G.K. Chesterton (1990)). 
 15. Pauline Maier, American Scripture: Making the Declaration of Independ-
ence (1998). 
 16. Ferrara, supra note 14, at 604 (quoting Chesterton, supra note 14, at 41–45)). 
 17. Id. at 605. 
 18. Id. 
 19. Id. at 605 (quoting Richard John Neuhaus, Doing Well and Doing Good 4 
(1992)). For a compendious survey of the extensive literature about the extent to which the found-
ers and the founding documents were Lockean, see The Selected Political Writings of 
John Locke, supra note 7, at 386–98. As I indicate below, in Section IV of this Article, I agree 
with Christopher Ferrara’s account of how the radical Enlightenment, including the thought of 
Locke, led to the founding of the nation and, over time, to the current dilemma of legalizing 
same-sex unions. 
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theory. As Mark Tushnet has explained unexceptionably, “[t]he philo-
sophical basis for liberal political theory came from a reaction against 
the theology of Catholicism. . . .”20 “The liberal tradition accommo-
dated religion,” Tushnet continues, “by relegating it to the sphere of 
private life, a sphere whose connections to public life were of essen-
tially no interest.”21 While the founders were not all “liberals,” some 
being civic republicans, they were all but united in rejecting the Cath-
olic understanding of man, the state, and the Church.22 It is not an 
exaggeration to say that a principal purpose behind this nation’s found-
ing was to create a polity devoid of the Catholic Church and her tra-
ditional teaching about the nature of human happiness.23 Locke was 
one among many influential anti-Catholic founders and supporters. 
And now, as the founders’ Founders’ liberal principles continue to 
work themselves pure, as the saying has it, the time has finally come 
for the Greco-Catholic understanding of marriage to go, for it has no 
place in the anti-Catholic creed. 
It should go without saying that the Greco-Catholic tradition is 
not now—nor has it ever been—opposed to happiness, correctly un-
derstood. Rather than as the removal of “uneasiness” in the exercise of 
negative liberty, however, that tradition teaches that man has a sum-
mum bonum, in which his happiness consists. It is given by nature, 
awaits discovery by human intelligence, and is to be achieved. And it is, 
furthermore, the role of the state to assist man, including by prudent 
use of the compulsion of law, in discovering and achieving that sum-
mum bonum. This, again, is exactly what the Founders meant to rule 
out, and today’s constructivists are keen to follow the Founders’ rules. 
Make no mistake about it: “the question regarding the summum bonum, 
the supreme good of man, which is the primary question raised by the 
tradition . . . is a perfectly idle question for Locke.”24 
 
 20. Mark Tushnet, The Constitution of Religion, 18 Conn. L. Rev. 701, 731 (1986). 
 21. Id. at 731–32. 
 22. For a mostly admiring account of the steady growth of Lockean liberalism in the coun-
try’s life and constitutional law, see Nelson Tebbe, Religious Institutionalism and Constitutional Ar-
gument, J. Contemp. Legal Issues (forthcoming 2013). 
 23. The founders’ and their immediate successors’ antipathy for all things Catholic is stag-
gering. For a summary, see Alan Brownstein, Protecting the Religious Liberty of Institutions, J. Con-
temp. Legal Issues (forthcoming 2013). 
 24. Manent, supra note 6, at 130. The “new Lockean notion of ‘the pursuit of happiness’ 
[is] explicitly opposed to the classical idea of a ‘summum bonum,’ or attainment of happiness.” 
Thomas Pangle, The Spirit of Modern Republicanism 20 (1988). 
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III. To Live the Truth 
But what, then, is to be done about same-sex unions at law if, as is 
the case, the nation’s founding ideas are Lockean and otherwise liberal, 
rather than Greco-Catholic? Does this nation’s constitutional com-
mitment not require that the state implement through law the Lockean 
rather than the Greco-Catholic conception of happiness? James Mad-
ison in Federalist No. 14 gushed that it was the glory of the American 
people to have “accomplished a revolution which has no parallel in the 
annals of human society. They reared the fabrics of governments 
which have no model on the face of the globe. . . . If their works betray 
imperfections, we wonder at the fewness of them.”25 Is it not a matter 
of first importance to be faithful to the fabrics of government they 
reared? Locke, “the confused man’s Hobbes,”26 anticipated this very 
issue and, of course, answered proleptically in the affirmative. Accord-
ing to Locke in the Second Treatise of Government, “he that has once, by 
actual agreement, and any express declaration, given his consent to be of 
any commonwealth, is perpetually and indispensably obliged to be, and re-
main unalterably a subject to it, and can never be again in the liberty of 
the state of nature; unless, by any calamity, the government he was 
under comes to be dissolved, or else by some public act cuts him off 
from being any longer a member of it.”27 In an unmistakable reference 
to the Catholic Church and the papacy, Locke adds: “nor can any oaths 
to any foreign power whatsoever, or any domestic subordinate power, 
discharge any member of society from his obedience to the legisla-
tive . . . .”28 Does this not mean that American citizens are precluded 
from in engaging in non-revolutionary resistance to what is ordained 
by the legislative power? 
I answer “no.” Locke’s meaning is clear, but his theses are, in my 
estimation, mistaken. Again, it is a central tenet of Greco-Catholic phi-
losophy that man is to live the truth, veritatem agere, and from this it 
follows that no particular piece or constellation of pieces of positive 
law can conclusively block that project, even if Lockean philosophy 
insists otherwise.29 The fully human project entails that human living 
 
 25. The Federalist No. 14, at 80 (James Madison) (E.H. Scott ed., 1898). 
 26. C.B. Macpherson, The Political Theory of Possessive Individualism: 
Hobbes to Locke 25 (1962). 
 27. Locke, The Second Treatise of Government, supra note 10, at 70–71 (emphasis added). 
 28. Id. at 75–76, cited in Ferrara, supra note 14, at 73. 
 29. For a compendious and classic statement of the Greco-Catholic position, see Josef 
Pieper, Living the Truth 171 (1989) (“Moral action is ‘doing the truth,’ veritatem agere.”). 
  
323] Same-Sex Union, the Summum Bonum, and Equality 
331 
is not to be exhaustively determined by whatever conceptual Tink-
ertoys happen to have been accumulated in a particular cultural box, 
even if that box be called a Declaration or a Constitution. Construc-
tivism is morally untenable per se and not just in its Lockean form. It is 
always available, indeed morally exigent, for men and societies to have 
further recourse—in prudent and structured ways—to the ends given 
by nature, in creation, and by supernature, in redemption. It is a fact 
about the human condition that “knowledge makes a slow, if not a 
bloody, entrance,”30 and sometimes even entire cultures can become 
distorted by error, even on a matter as basic as the nature of happiness. 
“So it is,” as Bernard Lonergan observes, 
that commonly men have to pay a double price for their personal at-
tainment of authenticity. Not only have they to undo their own lapses 
from righteousness but more grievously they have to discover what 
is wrong in the tradition they have inherited and they have to struggle 
against the massive undertow it sets up.31 
Neither Locke nor any other mortal is authorized to issue a labor-
saving, history-stopping dispensation. 
It seems to me inescapable and even obvious that the Lockean her-
itage of this nation is on the side of legal recognition of same-sex un-
ions. The refusal to grant legal recognition to same-sex union, further-
more, cannot be had on the cheap, at least if it is to be a principled 
refusal. In order to avoid—on honest grounds—granting such recog-
nition, it is necessary to call into question, indeed to repudiate, central 
ideas that drove this nation’s founding and have shaped its subsequent 
history. Much of what today passes as neo-conservativism in this na-
tion boils down to revolutionary crypto-Lockeanism by another (and 
quite misleading) name. I would suggest that the moment has come for 
neo-cons to double down, so to speak. The time is ripe, indeed over-
due, to loosen the hold of the dead hand of Locke and to take up once 
again the cause of politics rooted in truth. As the saying goes, statecraft 
is soul-craft writ large, and souls can be lost. Sadly, it took the issue of 
marriage itself, the very condition of the possibility of the continuation 
of humanity, to clarify the deadly drift of a nation dedicated to happi-
ness as no more than the removal of “uneasiness.” Now is the time for 
the constructivist “conservative” to convert to Greco-Catholicism. 
 
 30. Bernard J.F. Lonergan, Insight: A Study of Human Understanding 186 (Phil-
osophical Library 3d ed. 1970). 
 31. Bernard J.F. Lonergan, A Third Collection 121 (Frederick E. Crowe ed., 1985). 
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IV. Judge Reinhardt’s Follies 
Returning to the question of Locke’s own influence on the found-
ing of the United States, my contestable claim—which certainly flies 
in the face of the mythology about this being a “Christian nation,”—
deserves extensive justification. That justification has recently been 
given elsewhere, specifically by Christopher A. Ferrara in his book Lib-
erty, The God That Failed: Policing the Sacred and Constructing the Myths 
of the Secular State, from Locke to Obama.32 I commend Ferrara’s book 
to the reader’s attention. In my judgment, it precludes Peter Augustine 
Lawler’s optative judgment that the nation was “built better than [the 
founders] knew.”33 
For present purposes I ask the reader to accept my stipulation that 
the nation was founded and dedicated to “liberty” understood as (what 
the philosophers refer to as) “negative liberty,”—that is, the right to 
be let alone in the “pursuit of happiness” by the removal of “uneasi-
ness.” As John Milbank states on the jacket of Liberty, the God that 
Failed, “Ferrara’s book most persuasively demonstrates that negative 
liberty is an idol and that liberalism is the last of the ideologies. Indeed 
he shows that it was the basic ideology hidden behind all the others.”34 
I consider it to be uncontroversial to observe that, except in the context 
of showing how the “pursuit of happiness” leads to the requirement of 
legal recognition of same-sex marriage, most Americans are keen to 
declare—and not just on the Fourth of July—that this nation is dedi-
cated to the pursuit of happiness for all. By “happiness” they emphati-
cally do not mean the achievement of man’s summum bonum. 
If the reader is inclined to doubt the truth of my stipulation, how-
ever, and even if the reader does not doubt it, it is worthwhile to rec-
ollect that a majority of what often passes (erroneously) as a “conserva-
tive” Supreme Court no longer find the entailments, at least, of such a 
founding principle to be the least bit controversial. Needless to say, I 
am referring to Lawrence v. Texas, the case that perhaps more than any 
other provides the background against which debate about the possible 
constitutional requirement of legal recognition of same-sex union goes 
forward. Justice Anthony Kennedy’s majority opinion begins with this 
 
 32. Ferrara, supra note 14. 
 33. Peter Augustine Lawler, Better Than They Knew: A Response to Patrick Deneen, On the 
Square (Jan. 25, 2013), http://www.firstthings.com/onthesquare/2013/01/better-than-they-
knew-a-response-to-patrick-deneen. 
 34. Ferrara, supra note 14, at jacket. 
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now-well-known paean to a particular, and historically eccentric, un-
derstanding of liberty: 
 Liberty protects the person from unwarranted government intru-
sions into a dwelling or other private places. In our tradition the State 
is not omnipresent in the home. And there are other spheres of our 
lives and existence, outside the home, where the State should not be 
a dominant presence. Freedom extends beyond spatial bounds. Lib-
erty presumes an autonomy of self that includes freedom of thought, 
belief, expression, and certain intimate conduct. The instant case in-
volves liberty of the person both in its spatial and in its more trans-
cendent dimensions.35 
The Court was not so blinded by its enthrallment with negative 
liberty that it forgot to remind students of its opinion that “injury to a 
person” is not constitutionally protected.36 But having implicitly con-
cluded that the pursuit of what the Court referred to as “a homosexual 
lifestyle” causes no such injury, the Court held that “[t]he Texas statute 
furthers no legitimate state interest which can justify its intrusion into 
the personal and private life of the individual.”37 
Justice Antonin Scalia captured the Lockean underpinning of the 
Court’s pseudo-analysis, as well as its entailments, in just one sentence: 
“[T]he Court simply describes petitioners’ conduct as ‘an exercise of 
their liberty’—which it undoubtedly is—and proceeds to apply an un-
heard-of form of rational-basis review that will have far-reaching im-
plications beyond this case.”38 With respect to those implications, Jus-
tice Scalia observed as follows: 
State laws against bigamy, same-sex marriage, adult incest, prostitu-
tion, masturbation, adultery, fornication, bestiality, and obscenity are 
likewise sustainable only in light of Bowers’ validation of laws based 
on moral choices. Every single one of these laws is called into ques-
tion by today’s decision; the Court makes no effort to cabin the scope 
of its decision to exclude them from its holding. See ante, at 572 (not-
ing “an emerging awareness that liberty gives substantial protection 
to adult persons in deciding how to conduct their private lives in mat-
ters pertaining to sex” (emphasis added)). The impossibility of distin-
guishing homosexuality from other traditional “morals” offenses is 
precisely why Bowers rejected the rational-basis challenge. “The law,” 
 
 35. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 562 (2003). 
 36. Id. at 567. 
 37. Id. at 578. 
 38. Id. at 586 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 BYU Journal of Public Law  [Vol. 27 
334 
it said, “is constantly based on notions of morality, and if all laws rep-
resenting essentially moral choices are to be invalidated under the 
Due Process Clause, the courts will be very busy indeed.”39  
What a massive disruption of the current social order, therefore, 
the overruling of Bowers entails.40 
And so it has. Lawrence was decided in 2003, just a decade ago, and now 
we can fast forward to 2010 and Judge Vaughan Walker’s opinion in 
Perry v. Schwarzenegger overturning California’s Proposition 8 that de-
fined marriage as between a man and a woman. Among his findings of 
fact, Judge Walker includes the following assertion about the illegiti-
macy of moral judgment as a valid ground for state action:“In the ab-
sence of a rational basis, what remains of the proponents’ case is an 
inference, amply supported by evidence in the record, that Proposition 
8 was premised on the belief that same-sex couples simply are not as 
good as opposite-sex couples.”41 
Needless to say, Judge Walker’s citations to Romer, Moreno, and 
Palmore, for the proposition that moral judgment, as such, is an unac-
ceptable basis for legislation, are wholly unavailing. 
But Judge Stephen Reinhardt, in the Ninth Circuit Court’s opin-
ion upholding the district court 2–1,42 was happy to extend Judge 
Walker’s novel analysis. Judge Reinhardt conceded that California’s 
Proposition 8 was not subject to any heightened scrutiny for the simple 
reason that the U.S. Supreme Court has never held that sexual orien-
tation is a suspect classification. Judge Reinhardt acknowledged that 
Proposition 8 was subject to the lower hurdle of rational-basis review, 
but he concluded that it did not clear even that low hurdle. Although 
Judge Reinhardt admitted that “[a]s a general rule, states may use their 
 
 39. Id. at 590 (quoting Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 196 (1986)). 
 40. Id. 
 41. Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921 (N.D. Cal. 2010), aff’d sub nom. Perry 
v. Brown, 671 F.3d 1052 (9th Cir.), cert. granted sub nom., Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 786 
(2012). Walker continues: 
Whether that belief is based on moral disapproval of homosexuality, animus towards 
gays and lesbians or simply a belief that a relationship between a man and a woman is 
inherently better than a relationship between two men or two women, this belief is not 
a proper basis on which to legislate. 
Id. (citing Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 635 (1996); Dept. of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 
534 (1973); Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 433 (1984)). 
 42. Perry v. Brown, 671 F.3d 1052 (9th Cir.), cert. granted sub nom., Hollingsworth v. 
Perry, 133 S. Ct. 786 (2012). 
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police powers to regulate the ‘morals’ of their population,”43 he imme-
diately eviscerated this concession and echoed Walker by asserting that 
moral judgment, as such, does not constitute a legitimate state interest, 
and that “animus, negative attitudes, fear, a bare desire to harm, and 
moral disapproval” are equally unconstitutional grounds for legisla-
tion.44 A remark by Justice O’Connor in her concurrence in Lawrence 
v. Texas supports Judge Reinhardt’s assertion: “Indeed, we have never 
held that moral disapproval, without any other asserted state interest, 
is a sufficient rationale under the Equal Protection Clause to justify a 
law that discriminates among groups of persons.”45 Judge Reinhardt 
speculates that “[t]he Lawrence majority opinion seems to have implic-
itly agreed” with Justice O’Connor’s remark, from which putative fact 
Judge Reinhardt would have us conclude that moral judgment, as such, 
is not a legitimate state interest as a matter of Supreme Court prece-
dent.46 
Walker’s and Reinhardt’s respective contributions to the law of the 
U.S. Constitution are novelties, but hardly surprising. They are the 
last necessary steps in the inexorable logic of a juridically enforceable 
right to “the pursuit of happiness” as the removal of “uneasiness.” A 
refusal to grant legal recognition to same-sex union causes “uneasi-
ness” to those who would find some or even much happiness in the 
expressive value, as well as the other benefits, of legal recognition of 
their homosexual union. But note that any legal enforcement of moral 
judgment always will cause uneasiness for some, except in an imagined 
world in which all are already virtuous.47 To the extent the Lockean 
definition of happiness stands, laws rooted in moral judgment must 
fall. 
Back in reality, however, recognition of the twin facts of Creation 
and The Fall is the kiss of death for such a magical world bereft, sim-
ultaneously, of both morality and uneasiness. Ample attention to the 
consequences of our being created and also fallen, furthermore, fo-
cuses the mind on why the point and justification of law and govern-
ment are not just giving people what they happen to want by the removal 
of “uneasiness.” It is, instead, about giving them the help they need to 
 
   43. Id. at 1101. 
 44. Id. at 1102 (citing Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 635 (1996)). 
 45. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 582 (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
 46. Perry, 671 F.3d at 1102. 
 47. I should add that even a perfectly virtuous people would require the exercise of polit-
ical (and other) authority. See Yves R. Simon, A General Theory of Authority 47–50 (1962). 
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achieve their summum bonum, which is discovered not invented. 
V. What Human Beings Are For 
Or is it? “It may seem quite obvious,” philosopher Michael J. 
White observes, 
[T]hat political organization—that whole governmental complex of 
legislative, administrative, and judicial machinery associated with res-
idents of a particular geographical area during some temporal pe-
riod—has some function, purpose, or point. Political machinery 
should do something for us individually—and perhaps collectively. 
Otherwise, why bother with it?48 
Indeed, but, “[o]n the other hand,” White continues: 
[I]t may not seem at all obvious, at least to us inhabitants of Western 
constitutional states at the beginning of the third millennium, that 
human beings have any such function or point. We humans just seem 
to be here—with all our individual desires and aversions, our 
strengths, weaknesses, virtues, and vices, our abilities and accom-
plishments.49 
The ensuing absurdity is apparent, as White helps us to see: 
So political philosophy is charged with giving a rich account of the 
proper role of political organization without appeal to any concep-
tion (which would almost certainly be controversial) of what human 
beings are for—that is, without any rich conception of human nature, 
function, or purpose . . . . 50 
In other words, political philosophy is charged with giving an ac-
count of the point of governing for a class of pointless governed, except 
to the extent that the point of the governed is constituted by all and 
only what they happen to come up with as their point(s). The resulting 
dilemma or, rather, impossibility is that, 
[t]hrough its judicial organ, government will always appear either to 
be in arrears on the scope of liberty (always catching up to the latest 
revisions and concepts of free selfhood), or to be arbitrary in the way 
it sets determinate limits (the very purpose of which is to make power 
predictable) . . . . [A]s to rights, the Court is caught in the perpetual 
 
 48. Michael J. White, Political Philosophy 3 (2d ed. 2012). 
 49. Id. 
 50. Id. at 5. 
  
323] Same-Sex Union, the Summum Bonum, and Equality 
337 
cycle of being over- and under-inclusive.51 
To be adequate to the right to liberty as conceived by Locke, the 
Court would have to be clairvoyant. 
Approaching the issue from another angle, before Lawrence, those 
seeking to challenge government regulation bore the burden of 
demonstrating that their fundamental rights were being violated or, in 
other words, that government was violating the natural law. Under 
Lawrence, however, there would now seem to be a “presumption of lib-
erty,” with the result that when faced with a plausible claim to an ex-
ercise of liberty, government must justify the regulation.52 But, by its 
own proud profession, the Court lacks the resources to do so, because, 
as it said in Lawrence: “Our obligation is to define the liberty of all, not 
to mandate our own moral code.”53 
To be sure, this idea, of defining liberty without making moral 
judgments, is incoherent and utterly impossible—and this is exactly the 
point that needs to be made in the face of such solemn but absurd as-
sertions. It is simply not possible “to define the liberty of all” without 
making judgments that are moral, that is, about what should or should 
not be done. And this just is the perennial domain of human practical 
reason, the natural law, and the divine law. In the same breath with 
which it claimed not to be reaching moral judgments (“not to mandate 
our moral code”), the Lawrence Court enacted its own preferred moral 
theory. No rational person can fail to see that a vindication of liberty 
still requires distinguishing it from license. The “liberty” to torture 
innocent children is not going to be recognized as a matter of legal 
“right,” no matter how “essential” someone may think it is to his self-
definition. For example, in arguing for “boundless respect”—bound-
less!!!—for individual conscience and consequent liberty, Martha 
Nussbaum promptly retreats: “this principle does not imply that all 
religions and views of life must be (equally) respected by government . 
. . . If people seek to torture children . . . citing their religion as their 
 
 51. Russell Hittinger, Liberalism and the American Natural Law Tradition, 25 Wake Forest 
L. Rev. 429, 494 (1990). 
 52. Randy Barnett, Restoring the Lost Constitution: The Presumption of Lib-
erty 253–69 (2004); see also Patrick McKinley Brennan, The Individual Mandate, Sovereignty, and 
the Ends of Good Government: A Reply to Professor Randy Barnett, 159 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1623, 1640–
48 (2011). 
 53. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 562 (2003) (quoting Planned Parenthood of South-
ern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 850 (1992)). 
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reason, their claims must be resisted even though they may be sin-
cere.”54 Mirabile dictu, there turn out to be perfectly firm moral bounds 
on what was boldly, but wrongly described as “boundless.” And this is 
as it should be, but not just in the breech.55 
Some philosophers can see what an increasing number of Ameri-
can jurists cannot see: “the claim that it is not possible to legislate mo-
rality is both false and absurd.”56 Governments legislate morality all 
the time, and the only important question is whose morality will be leg-
islated. Why should Locke’s moral theory or John Stuart Mill’s be the 
presumptively privileged one? The Greco-Catholic tradition counters 
that it is the morality given by the natural law and clarified by the di-
vine law that is to be our guide, the basic precepts of which law are: to 
preserve its own being, to engage in sexual intercourse with a person 
of the opposite sex, to rear and educate offspring, “and to know the 
truth about God, and to live in society.”57 These, in barest outline, are 
the rudiments of man’s earthly summum bonum. To it is added, by the 
grace of redemption, his supernatural summum bonum, enjoyment of 
the supernatural common good. It is the role of the state to assist man 
in the achievement of both,58 and for that the state needs the assistance 
and cooperation of the Church, because, as Benjamin Rush wrote, 
“nothing but the gospel of Jesus Christ will effect the mighty work of 
making nations happy.”59 
I now turn to this last point, the role of the Church. 
 
 54. Martha C. Nussbaum, Liberty of Conscience: In Defense of America’s Tra-
dition of Religious Equality 19, 24 (2008) (emphasis omitted). 
 55. The two preceding paragraphs are adapted from Patrick McKinley Brennan, The Place 
of ‘Higher Law’ in the Quotidian Practice of Law: Herein of Practical Reason, Natural Law, Natural 
Rights, and Sex Toys, 7 Geo. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 437, 469–70 (2009). 
 56. John M. Rist, Real Ethics: Rethinking the Foundations of Morality 130 
(2002). 
 57. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica pt. I-II, question 94, art. 2 (Fathers of the 
English Dominican Province trans., 1947) (1274). 
 58. This requires recovering the understanding of the state that Hobbes and Locke, along 
with Jean Bodin and others, demolished. 
In the sixteenth century the word ‘state’ itself came to indicate less the community or 
society as a whole than its government, itself frequently viewed as in at least potential 
opposition to the citizen. Thus any state, and later even any ‘community,’ might be 
perceived no longer as a means to the individual’s growth but as a threat to his auton-
omy. 
Rist, supra note 55, at 209. 
 59. Patrick McKinley Brennan, The Mighty Work of Making Nations Happy: A Response to 
James Davison Hunter, 39 Pepp. L. Rev. 1091, 1105 (2013). 
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VI. The Care of Souls 
So far I have focused on how Locke’s degraded (and degrading) 
notion of happiness must be rejected in order to make cultural and 
legal space for man’s summum bonum. There is yet another Lockean 
legacy, though, that impedes our ability to do that very thing: the ban-
ishment of the Church. Before taking the measure of that banishment’s 
consequences, we need to return briefly to another element of Locke’s 
starting point. 
One of the putative reasons Locke defines happiness as he does is 
that he comes to the question of happiness already convinced that 
“[w]e do not know what man is.”60 In Locke’s view it is not, of course, 
that we know nothing about man. What we do not know, pace the 
Greco-Catholic tradition, is man as a substance,—that is, man as a hy-
lomorphic unity of body and soul with a hierarchy of given ends, ful-
fillment of which constitutes his summum bonum. As Pierre Manent has 
written, “[t]hat man is a substance and one substance, that is the Carthago 
delenda of the new philosophy”61 of which Locke is the exemplary de-
veloper. 
In the universe of Locke’s philosophy, man knows that he is an 
animal, and, in fact, fear of hunger is what drives man from the (imag-
inary) “state of nature” into the “bonds of civil society.”62 To quote 
Manent again, “Locke will erect the lofty structure of the liberal . . . 
state on the puny base of the solitary animal in search of food.”63 What 
can no longer provide the base of politics, as it had in the Greco-Cath-
olic tradition, is knowledge of man as a substance. Locke makes clear 
in the Essay Concerning Human Understanding that moral notions are 
arbitrary artifacts of man, not given or guaranteed by nature.64 Greco-
Catholic thought sought to know man and to be guided by what was 
proper to him, not exclusively by his animality. “Modern thought,” by 
contrast, 
despairs that men will ever agree on what is proper to man, on human 
substance or ends, and thus it wants to bracket the question of what 
is proper to man. It seeks to keep man in his efficacious indetermina-
 
 60. Manent, supra note 6, at 124. 
 61. Id. at 113. 
 62. See Locke, The Second Treatise of Government, supra note 10, at 57–58. 
 63. Manent, supra note 6, at 124. 
 64. Id. at 117. 
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tion so that, by taking his bearings from what is not human but ani-
mal and thus determined and necessary, he might construct a human 
world whose order is independent of human opinions, where man 
can affirm himself without knowing himself, where he can be free.65 
Locke is quite serious about how little we can know about man. 
For example, he holds that the idea of murder is “arbitrary.”66 Like-
wise, the question concerning man’s summum bonum is, as Locke sees 
it, as pointless as the question “whether the best relish were to be found 
in apples, plumbs, or nuts.”67 And for those who would relish it, polyg-
amy is, as people today like to say, “an option:” “He that is already 
married may marry another woman . . . . The ties, duration, and con-
ditions of the left hand marriage shall be no other than what is ex-
pressed in the contract of marriage between the parties.”68 
Men who can know so little of themselves would benefit, one 
might think, from the supernatural teaching authority of the Church 
on matters of faith and morals. This, though, Locke-the-tolerant will 
not tolerate. 
On the one hand, Locke postulates “the Law of Toleration”69 and 
“the Duty of Toleration”70: “The Establishment of this one thing 
would take away all ground of Complaints and Tumults upon account 
of Conscience. And . . . there would remain nothing in these Assem-
blies that were not more peaceable, and less apt to produce Disturb-
ance of State . . . .”71 The overarching aim of securing social peace and 
quiet ensures that the Law of Toleration binds the Church as much as 
it binds the state; indeed, churches must be “obliged to lay down Tol-
eration as the Foundation of their own Liberty[,] and teach that liberty 
of conscience is every mans [sic] natural Right, equally belonging to 
Dissenters as to themselves . . . .”72 
On the other hand, however, the Law of Toleration does not extend 
 
 65. Id. at 129. 
 66. Locke, The Second Treatise of Government, supra note 10, at 76. 
 67. John Locke, Essay Concerning Human Understanding, in The Selected Political 
Writings of John Locke, supra note 7, 184, 191, 
 68. Locke, Political Essays, supra note 13, at 256. 
 69. John Locke, A Letter Concerning Toleration 51 (James H. Tully ed., Hackett 
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to papists and fanatics.73 Not just papists, but the Church herself, can-
not be tolerated: “The Church can have no right to be tolerated by the 
magistrate [whose members] . . . deliver themselves up to the protec-
tion and service of another prince. For by this means the magistrate 
would give way to the settling of a foreign jurisdiction in his own coun-
try . . . .”74 
I would not for a moment suggest that natural human reason is in 
principle incapable of discovering the nature of marriage.75 My point is 
that when the state is deprived of the supernatural assurances of the 
Church on the nature of marriage, among other matters of life and 
death, the state and its laws are at the whim of popular opinion, 
whether erroneous or true. As I noted at the outset, whole cultures can 
be mistaken about matters of great moral magnitude. St. Thomas, for 
example, thought that the German people were ignorant of the fact 
that theft is a crime.76 It is a Lockean legacy that our state’s widening 
misunderstanding of marriage cannot be corrected and transformed by 
the operation of the Church’s powers. The state that does not recog-
nize that it is bound by higher law is absolute in its power, including 
the power to redefine marriage by legislative ipse dixit. As historian Pe-
ter Gay has observed, “political absolutism and religious toleration 
[are] the improbable twins of the modern state system.”77 In Locke’s 
dispensation, man is left to take care of himself, for neither Church nor 
state has care of his soul: “[T]he Care of Souls is not committed to the 
Civil Magistrate, any more than to other men. . . . The care of each man’s 
soul and of the things of heaven, which neither does belong to the common-
wealth nor can be subjected to it, is left entirely to every man’s self.”78 In 
the discarded Greco-Catholic tradition, by contrast, man could count 
on Church and state to cooperate, sometimes more successfully than 
others, for the good of his soul. Even the chimera of “natural law lib-
eralism” pushed by some neo-conservatives today is incapable of cog-
nizing and serving souls. 
 
 73. Locke, supra note 69, at 17. 
 74. Locke, supra note 7, at 157. 
 75. Cf. Sherif Girgis, Ryan Anderson & Robert George, What is Marriage? Man 
and Woman: A Defense (2012). 
 76. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica, supra note 57 at art. 4. 
 77. Peter Gay, The Enlightenment: The Rise of Modern Paganism 298–99 (1996), 
discussed in Ferrara, supra note 14, at 99. 
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Who got the benefit of what some have called “modernity’s wa-
ger?”79 Contemporary neo-conservatives continue to side with Locke 
against the older tradition in which statecraft is soul craft. The proof 
is in the pudding, however—and the present pudding is the previously 
unthinkable, but perfectly logical dismantling of marriage for the pur-
pose of removing “uneasiness” in the “pursuit of happiness.” The Dec-
laration of Independence leads to moral independence—but not, how-
ever, to the true liberty of achieving the summum bonum. It would be 
better to reckon with the consequences of what we are, which is de-
pendent rational animals.80 
VII. Making Sense of Equality 
But we are not just dependent rational animals. We are rational 
animals who have been created in the image and likeness of the God 
who loved us into being, who redeemed all of humanity from the ef-
fects of Adam’s Fall, and who wishes us to be happy with Him in the 
Kingdom for all eternity. It is a fundamental tenet of Catholic theol-
ogy, however, that God does not save us all on His own. Each of us has 
a role to play. God invites and even commands us to cooperate, but we 
remain “free” to disobey. Either way we choose, we enjoy a breathtak-
ing equality in that God “desires all men to be saved, and to come to 
the knowledge of the truth.”81 While it is God’s consequent will that 
the disobedient be damned, it is His antecedent will that all be saved.82 
The debate and discourse about legal recognition of same-sex un-
ions make much of “equality,” but except for God’s antecedent will 
that all men be saved, it is hard to say in what significant respect, if any, 
humans are in fact equal.83 Here, too, those committed to the suffi-
ciency of the principles on which the nation was founded are bound to 
be embarrassed. “All men are created equal,” but in respect of what? 
The authors of the Declaration never say. Equality is not sameness 
simpliciter. Equality is sameness in respect of some particular—but in this 
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case unstated—predicate. It is trivially true that all humans are equally 
possessed of human nature, but from this it does not follow that they 
have an equal right, or any right at all, to do what they will. John Rawls 
struggled with the question of natural human equality, and I would 
venture to say even stumbled over it.84 
I have just been discussing equality as a descriptive or ontological 
possibility. On the related, but distinct question of equality as a norma-
tive matter—yes, of course, it is a principle of the natural law that all 
men and women are normatively entitled to equal treatment “under 
law.” It is equally a principle of the natural law, however, that an unjust 
“law” is no law at all, and a human “law” that valorized same-sex union 
would be unjust in the relevant, viz., a violation of higher law.85 
True human equality consists in the Good News: the surprising 
news that salvation is offered to all, but on the Offeror’s, not the offer-
ees’, terms. This is the news the Church brings, along with the means 
to bring it to completion. This is news that Locke and the nation’s 
fabled founders hid under a bushel basket. It is time to put it on a ped-
estal and make the nation happy, by which I do not mean removing 
“uneasiness.” 
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